Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Despite the worldwide attention that transparency has received in the last decade, empirical studies on its determinants are still quite limited. In recent years scholars and financial institutions have concentrated their studies on the positive effects of fiscal transparency such as improved access to international capital markets, the attraction of foreign direct investment, prevention of financial crises and reduction of interest rate spreads. As is often the case, light was shed on the topic following hard shocks; for instance, both the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1997) crises became turning points in the debate, raising concerns about the possible impacts of a lack of transparency. Starting from the reasonable expectation that policy recommendations which solely emphasize economic factors while disregarding institutional concerns may be unsubstantiated, we investigate the role of the institutional environment in shaping the informational structure of various national fiscal systems. Kopits and Craig (1998) identify fiscal transparency as "openness toward the public at large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on government activities so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government's financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic and social implications." Some researchers study the relationships between fiscal transparency and fiscal performances and/or other macroeconomic indicators, providing several explanations and different theories rather than a unique and shared answer. For instance, Hameed (2005) runs a cross-country regression with 57 observations and concludes that transparency matters for credit rankings in the sense that they are positively related to transparency, and that countries with higher fiscal transparency general index have better fiscal discipline. assesses the role of fiscal transparency in establishing better fiscal discipline. Considering 27 ex-socialist countries, he finds a negative, although weak, relationship between fiscal transparency and debt accumulation. Furthermore, he finds that there is no statistically significant evidence supporting the importance of fiscal transparency in determining fiscal performance, and only marginal significance when correcting for endogeneity. Incidentally, Gleich (2003) shows that budget procedures which reduce collective action problems in Eastern Europe are associated with increased fiscal discipline. Milesi-Ferreti (2004) studies the interactions between fiscal transparency and fiscal rules, focusing on the effects of the Maastricht Treaty on EU member countries. He finds that fiscal transparency shapes fiscal performance, as a highly transparent fiscal context makes politicians implement the measures necessary to balance the budget. show that fiscal transparency reduces public debt and deficits, even after controlling for political variables like common law history, political competition, and presidential system. Ferejohn (1999) models transparency as a constitutional choice of an information structure. At the beginning of every period the incumbent chooses the degree of precision of the signal perceived by the electors (principals), knowing that in most cases this informational accuracy would be directly proportional to the amount of resources that voters would be willing to allocate to politicians. Agents who want to manage a larger amount of public goods will raise fiscal transparency levels in order to be perceived as more trustworthy by voters who will eventually give them more resources. Alt and Lowry (1994) argue that democrats increase transparency to achieve their preferred higher amount of public goods, while Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) focus on the determinants of fiscal transparency by exploring its political and economic causes. They suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence transparency levels.
We use new data on fiscal transparency (FT) for a cross-section of countries, and these data possess several advantages. First, they are based on in-depth reports using a standardized methodology and protocol. Second, this is the first study that has such large country coverage, 82 in total. Third, the fiscal measures have been obtained with the collaboration of government authorities, which makes them particularly reliable. Finally, the data collection has been undertaken at a high level. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is the provision of a new We find that better institutions yield higher levels of fiscal transparency, and different aspects of the institutional framework have different impacts on our disaggregated fiscal transparency measures. Furthermore, we corrected for endogeneity by employing an instrumental variables approach. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines fiscal transparency, reviewing the relevant literature, explains our methodological strategy and presents our dataset. Section 3 presents and discusses empirical results and robustness checks. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Empirical Approach
We use new data from the IMF's Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Our index of FT is calculated for 82 countries, and to the best of our knowledge no other contribution in the literature has encompassed such a large sample. We started from the "Code of Good Practises on Fiscal Transparency" revised by the IMF in 2007, which contains 45 good practices summarized in one sentence each, and we selected 39 of them as the most relevant for 1 construct an index consisting of five clusters, including (1) medium-term budgeting and analysis, (2) accounting and data quality, (3) extra-budgetary fiscal operations, (4) intergovernmental relations, and (5) the role of auditing in the budgetary process and the importance of the Ministry of Finance over spending ministries. Guerrero (2001) uses an index of budget transparency a\developed by a group of civil and academic institutions for four Latin American countries focusing on: participation and elaboration of the budget, oversight, accountability and access to information. Gleich (2003) uses survey data for ten Eastern European countries and develops four indices that capture the stages of the budget process. code survey responses for nine budget procedures and create a transparency index. Allan and Perry (2003) go through the ROSCs for most of the European Union (EU) accession candidate countries and focus on medium-term frameworks, accounting, reporting and oversight standards, off budget activities and fiscal risks, and intergovernmental fiscal relations.
our purpose and the most frequently evaluated. 2 We then examined the ROSCs to see the extent to which each country followed IMF recommendations in each selected practice, assigning a mark between zero and ten: for example, "0" corresponds to "code not observed at all"; we marked "2" if the country's adherence to IMF suggestion was only minimal, "4" if it was limited, "6" if the Code was followed only partly, "8" if mostly followed, and "10" if the IMF's recommendations for that practice were totally respected. Our FT index is nothing but the mean of the marks assigned for each practice. 
Our econometric analysis will allow for different linear specifications, but the benchmark equation on which our analysis is based is the following:
where α is a constant, βs are the coefficients, CONTINENT is a vector of territorial dummies and ε i is an uncorrelated error with mean zero (for explanation of the other controls see below Using an unobserved components model that expresses the observed data as a linear function of unobserved governance plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors and/or sample variation in each indicator, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón aggregate the governance indicators into each of the six dimensions mentioned above. To arrive at an aggregate governance indicator, which we label quality of institutions (InstQual), we compute the mean of these values for each country. It is worth mentioning that these variables lack temporal coverage, as they have only been calculated since 1996 and are not available on an annual basis. The scores range from -2.5 to 2.5, and we take the average of the available values from 1996 to 2004. Again, the higher the value, the better the institutional quality indicator. Below, in the robustness checks section, we will also consider some variables contained in the well known Polity V database (Jaggers and Moore, 1995) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2006). 6 There is almost no ambiguity in predicting the sign of the coefficient β 2 of our institutional variable, intuitively expected to be positive and significant: in fact, politicians might have more incentives to promote FT in a sounder institutional context. More informed public opinion, a more efficient and honest bureaucracy, rule of law and control of corruption could 4 GovEff synthesizes features such as the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil servants from political pressures, and the credibility of the government. 5 RuLaw represents the extent to which citizens have confidence and abide by the rules of society such as the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, or the enforceability of contracts; cc refers to the perception of the degree of prevention of the exercise of public power for private gains. 6 The latter furnishes proxies to measure the extent to which various relevant institutional aspects are in place for a given country: government stability, military in power, law and order, control of corruption and quality of the bureaucracy. From the former database (Polity V), we borrowed the proxies POLITY2 and DEMOC, annual indices based on three categories that try to account for different aspects characteristics of a democracy: executive recruitment, responsiveness or independence of the executive authority and extent of political competition or opposition. We also included some political controls widely used in literature; they are taken from the WGI database (World Bank and Beck et al., 2006) . The literature predicts FT levels to be higher in countries where electoral competition is stronger, i.e., where the executive has a lower percentage of parliament seats (majority) compared to other countries. In fact, Hanssen (2004) finds that stiffer electoral competition positively affects the independence of (judiciary) institutions, and the same might happen to fiscal transparency. 7 We therefore include two proxies of political competition: the margin of votes (in percentage) of the majority in power and government fractionalization. , where there are two parties competing for authority and the incumbent can choose to delegate policy choice to an independent institution, the judiciary. 8 A priori, the effect of government fractionalization on fiscal transparency is ambiguous. If the government is composed by many parties, each of them would like to use public goods to pursue its own clientelistic interests, being sure that being accountable for, say, deficits, inefficiencies or bad performances is more difficult than in a one-party system, so reaching an agreement on reforms that open up the budget process to the public would be more difficult with many parties in power. Conversely, incumbents may prefer to have less discretion over public goods but limit the misuse of them by other incumbents (with whom they share office); thereby the fractionalized government could internally reach a compromise to manage resources in a transparent framework. Hypothetically, each ruling party might also be willing to let voters identify clearly who has done what in the government and open up the budget process to the electors. Alternatively, we could consider government fractionalization another measure Lastly, drawing on the predictions of , we could expect that the higher the political polarization, the less similar the preferences of opposite parties, and the higher the benefits of tying the hands of a partisan adversary. Nonetheless, these authors note that, while general agreement among political parties is needed in order to approve transparencyenhancing reforms, the probability of reaching a compromise might be inversely proportional to the distance between parties in the political/ideological spectrum. Since we cannot predict ex ante the sign of the coefficient of polarization, following Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004) we approximate political polarization with ethnic fractionalization. Table 4 presents simple correlations among our dependent variables and the institutional indicators. As can be observed, not only are the signs consistent with the logic that better institutions yield higher levels of fiscal transparency, but also the degree of correlation is quite strong, and in all cases it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Table 5 present results for our OLS regression, considering specifications (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The dependent variable is always our summary index of fiscal transparency, FT. As expected, in the OLS regression the InstQual coefficient is always highly significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient of Deficit in columns (2) and (3) is positive and significant, consistent with the findings of Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) . LogGDP is significant only when we run our benchmark regression (1), ceasing to be significant when more controls are included.
Findings
We acknowledge that our OLS estimation can suffer from endogeneity problems, particularly regarding variables such as InstQual, logGDP, and Deficit. This problem is encountered in much of the literature; for example, Petrie (2003) or Hameed (2005) . As mentioned above, in order to reduce reverse causality problems, all our macro-economic controls are expressed as the mean value of the decade 1990-2000, while FT indices refer at least to the of political competition, i.e., competition is so stiff that no party has the majority necessary to rule by itself and alliances are needed.
year 2001 onwards. We are still aware of the correlation between current levels and those of the recent past, so we control for endogeneity by running some two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions, instrumenting for the suspected endogenous variables with proxies widely used in the literature. We considered five possible instruments, but we decided to use only religious affiliation and legal system origin. We additionally instrument our possibly endogenous variables with settlers' mortality, latitude and ethnic fractionalization.
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Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003) have shown that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects institutions and subsequently GDP levels because the more ethnically fractionalized a country is, the more often dominant groups would shape governmental policies in order to expropriate from ethnic losers, restricting their freedom of opposition and limiting the production of public goods to prevent those outside the ruling group from benefiting and getting stronger (La Porta et al., 1998 As implied above, we decide to instrument GDP levels, deficit and institutional variables with legal system origin and percentages of Protestant, Catholic and Muslim individuals living in a given country. We decided to leave settlers' mortality and latitude out of the regression and to include ethnic fractionalization as a control in the main equation. The exclusion restriction implied by our IV strategy is that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, our instruments have no direct effect on fiscal transparency apart from determining our instrumented variables. In fact, we see no reason why legal system origin and religious affiliation could determine a country's FT but for shaping its institutions and influencing its GDP levels and fiscal performances.
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The last three columns of Table 5 report the results of our 2SLS regression-equations
(1), (2) and (3), respectively-which confirm the robustness of our OLS results: even when we control for endogeneity, institutions appear to have a positive and significant coefficient on FT, as well as on government fractionalization and inflation. In all the 2SLS regressions β 2-the coefficient referring to institutional quality-is almost doubled in comparison to the OLS regression. According to our 2SLS estimation of equation (1), a one-unit increase in our institutional quality index (which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5), might raise FT by 2.8 points, quite a strong impact if we consider that our fiscal transparency index is a 0-10 scale. To provide a practical example, our coefficient predicts that shifting from the institutional framework of Latvia to that of Germany would, ceteris paribus, increase FT by a quantity equal to the difference in FT between Spain and Bangladesh. Interestingly enough, instrumented income is never significant, while in column 6, which refers to equation (1), the coefficient of ETFRA is positive and significant, contrary to the results of Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) , but consistent with the idea that higher political polarization raises the incentives to tie opponents' hands with FT reforms.
In Table 6 we consider the three sub-indices of fiscal transparency, and we run our benchmark regression (1), both OLS and 2SLS, using each as a dependent variable. From this table we can observe that the quality of institutions variable yields the expected positive coefficient and it is always statistically significant. In terms of relative magnitude of the coefficients, institutions seem to affect mostly InfoAvail (especially in the 2SLS case), with the lowest coefficient for Quality&Resp.
As a robustness check, we observed the effect on fiscal transparency indices of each of the governance indicators that compose our InstQual summary index, as well as of other institutional proxies taken from other datasets described earlier. Tables 7 presents the results of OLS regression (1) for every sub-index, tested by each institutional component (2SLS results are available in Appendix 2). Every institutional proxy seem has a significant coefficient in explaining our FT summary index, apart from government stability measure taken from the ICRG database, but this variable is never significant in any regression. Apparently, whether governments are stable or change very often does not affect fiscal transparency in a given country; the same is true for political stability in determining data quality and clarity of responsibilities.
We acknowledge that our proxies for institutional quality may suffer of measurement error, and this "noise" may create an attenuation bias that lowers the value of our coefficients, although it is difficult to provide a numeric interpretation of our indices. We further aggregate our six indicators into a simple average in order to obtain a synthetic measure of the quality of institutions. Also, as some of these indicators may be more important than others in characterizing institutional quality or FT, assigning each of them equal weight may not be the best way of clustering them. We also applied Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to aggregate our measures. PCA is a method that aims at describing a variable with a set of variable with a lower dimensionality. Mathematically, we can define PCA as an orthogonal linear transformation that transforms the data into to a new coordinate system such that the greatest variance by any projection of the data comes to lie on the first coordinate (called the first principal component). Intuitively, with this method we obtain the best linear combination of the variables in a least square sense. The first principal component explains about 87 percent of the variations in institutional data, and factor loadings have almost the same weight, with the exception of Political Stability (PolStab), which is slightly lower than other variables.
14 Apart from the regressions reported, we control for other macro and political variables.
Among the former, we mention yearly GDP growth rate (instrumented and not), instrumented public debt over GDP, size of the public sector as a percentage of GDP, economic openness (measured as the amount of exports plus imports over the GDP), population, population squared, GDP per capita in levels, GDP per capita squared, instrumented inflation and external debt. The significance of our "institutional" coefficients is not affected when we include other "political variables," dummies to control for presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary system, plurality rules, proportional representation and "number of democratic governments since 1975."
Conclusions
In this paper we study the relation between fiscal transparency and institutional factors. Whereas fiscal transparency has become a prominent concern in recent decades, most of the research so far has tended to focus on the links between fiscal transparency and budget performance, fiscal discipline and other economic variables. If political, institutional and governance factors are examined in relation to fiscal transparency issues, though, they are more likely to be seen as determinants than explicative parameters. In our analysis, we show that institutions matter for fiscal transparency, as can be observed by the highly statistically significant results we obtained after using our fiscal transparency index and various governance indicators. Assembling data from 82 countries' ROSCs we provided a summary index of fiscal transparency and three subindices for different characteristics using information from public balance sheets: clarity and assurances of information, roles and responsibilities, open budget preparation, and public availability of information.
We found that higher levels of institutional quality or governance give way to better fiscal transparency indicators. Moreover, after considering possible endogeneity issues and instrumenting for the institutional and some economic variables, the two-stage least squares regression produced almost the same results as the OLS method. The evidence thereby supports our hypothesis that not only does fiscal transparency matters for institutional issues, but governance and quality of institutions are also determinants of fiscal transparency. Overall, our hypothesis that democratic institutions have a positive and significant impact on the transparency of public fiscal systems seems to be confirmed. 
Main Index IMF's Best practice definition Open Budget Processes
A budget calendar should be specified and adhered to. Adequate time should be allowed for the draft budget to be considered by the legislature.
The annual budget should be realistic, and should be prepared and presented within a comprehensive mediumterm macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework. Fiscal targets and any fiscal rules should be clearly stated and explained. A description of major expenditure and revenue measures, and their contribution to policy objectives, should be provided. Estimates should also be provided of their current and future budgetary impact and their broader economic implications The budget documentation should include an assessment of fiscal sustainability. The main assumptions about economic developments and policies should be realistic and clearly specified, and sensitivity analysis should be presented. There should be clear mechanisms for the coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary activities within the overall fiscal policy framework.
The accounting system should provide a reliable basis for tracking revenues, commitments, payments, arrears, liabilities, and assets.
A timely midyear report on budget developments should be presented to the legislature. More frequent updates, which should be at least quarterly, should be published.
Supplementary revenue and expenditure proposals during the fiscal year should be presented to the legislature in a manner consistent with the original budget presentation.
Audited final accounts and audit reports, including reconciliation with the approved budget, should be presented to the legislature and published within a year.
Public

Availability of Information
The budget documentation, including the final accounts, and other published fiscal reports should cover all budgetary and extra budgetary activities of the central government.
Information comparable to that in the annual budget should be provided for the outturns of at least the two preceding fiscal years, together with forecasts and sensitivity analysis for the main budget aggregates for at least two years following the budget. Statements describing the nature and fiscal significance of central government tax expenditures, contingent liabilities, and quasi-fiscal activities should be part of the budget documentation, together with an assessment of all other major fiscal risks. Receipts from all major revenue sources, including resource-related activities and foreign assistance, should be separately identified in the annual budget presentation.
The central government should publish information on the level and composition of its debt and financial assets, significant non debt liabilities (including pension rights, guarantee exposure, and other contractual obligations), and natural resource assets. The budget documentation should report the fiscal position of subnational governments and the finances of public corporations.
The government should publish a periodic report on long-term public finances.
A clear and simple summary guide to the budget should be widely distributed at the time of the annual budget.
Fiscal data should be reported on a gross basis, distinguishing revenue, expenditure, and financing, with expenditure classified by economic, functional, and administrative category.
The overall balance and gross debt of the general government, or their accrual equivalents, should be standard summary indicators of the government fiscal position. They should be supplemented, where appropriate, by other fiscal indicators, such as the primary balance, the public sector balance, and net debt. Results achieved relative to the objectives of major budget programs should be presented to the legislature annually.
The timely publication of fiscal information should be a legal obligation of the government. Advance release calendars for fiscal information should be announced and adhered to. The national audit body or equivalent organization should submit all reports, including its annual report, to the legislature and publish them. Mechanisms should be in place to monitor follow-up actions.
The annual budget and final accounts should indicate the accounting basis used in the compilation and presentation of fiscal data. Generally accepted accounting standards should be followed Clarity and assurances of data, roles and responsibilities Budget forecasts and updates should reflect recent revenue and expenditure trends, underlying macroeconomic developments, and well-defined policy commitments. Data in fiscal reports should be internally consistent and reconciled with relevant data from other sources. Major revisions to historical fiscal data and any changes to data classification should be explained. Public finances and policies should be subject to scrutiny by a national audit body or an equivalent organization that is independent of the executive. Independent experts should be invited to assess fiscal forecasts, the macroeconomic forecasts on which they are based, and their underlying assumptions. A national statistical body should be provided with the institutional independence to verify the quality of fiscal data. The structure and functions of government should be clear. The fiscal powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government should be well defined. The responsibilities of different levels of government, and the relationships between them, should be clearly specified. Relationships between the government and public corporations should be based on clear arrangements. Government relationships with the private sector should be conducted in an open manner, following clear rules and procedures. The collection, commitment, and use of public funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and other public finance laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. Laws and regulations related to the collection of tax and non-tax revenues, and the criteria guiding administrative discretion in their application, should be accessible clear, and understandable. Appeals of tax or non-tax obligations should be considered in a timely manner. There should be sufficient time for consultation about proposed laws and regulatory changes and, where feasible, broader policy changes. Contractual arrangements between the government and public or private entities, including resource companies and operators of government concessions, should be clear and publicly accessible. Government liability and asset management, including the granting of rights to use or exploit public assets, should have an explicit legal basis. Index constructed by taking the average of the scores (between 0 and 10) assigned to the practises evaluated in the ROSCs and listed in Table 1 .
Authors' calculation
Quality&Resp Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country follows IMF's Code of good practices in clarity and assurances of information, roles and responsibility. The higher the variable, the more transparent a country is in this area.
BudgPrep Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country follows IMF's Code of good practices in open budget preparation. The higher the variable, the more transparent a country is in this area.
InfoAvail Variable based on IMF country ROSCs to evaluate the extent to which a country follows IMF's Code of good practices in public availability of information. The higher the variable, the more transparent a country is in this area. 
WGI 2007
Govfract Government fractionalization: probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent seven territorial dummies (europe, asia, africa, middle east, oceania, north america, south america) are included in all the regressions but not reported the columns 1 2 and 3 consider LogGDP, InstQual and Deficit to be exogenous variables, and provide Ordinary Least Squares estimates. The columns 4 5 6 show the second stage of the two-stage least square procedure in order to account for possible endogeneity of these variables. The instruments used are legal system origin and percentage of muslim, catholic and protestant in any country. 
